and pronounced it utterly unsuitable. I must have felt relief when I wrote in my diary: "Major Marker with messages from Lord K., who is apparently willing to give up Torsappa and Mastung" (April 9, 1906).*

During a period of forty years, in which wild schemes abounded, sound views were seldom wanting, but failed to determine policy. I believe this failure to have been due to two main causes. Until the time of Mr. Balfour, there was no machinery in India or at home to ensure the close examination of the visionary projects of individuals who, in one way or another, were able to exercise influence. In the second place, the Home Government was not always able to exercise sufficient control over the Government of India even in matters which might prove to be of direct Imperial concern, while it has happened that momentous schemes were never discussed in the Viceroy's Council. On all these many questions I worked with the help of the late Captain A. B. Lindsay, my Indian assistant. Their aspects have now changed; but, in the archives of the C.I.D., the results of much careful study remain and may perhaps not be wholly useless in the future.

Of the many ex-Indian officials whom I consulted at this period, one stands out above all others. Sir Donald Stewart's judgments were the outcome of a strong, well-balanced intellect, which knew no variableness where Indian military problems were concerned. Only his natural modesty prevented him from being recognised as one of the best soldiers India has produced; but he was hardly more than a name to the public, and his march from Kandahar to Kabul—a difficult and even dangerous operation—is forgotten.

Sir Alfred Lyall sent me the following views in a letter of October 19, 1907, when I was serving on a committee dealing with Frontier matters: "I consider our engagements to defend the N.-W. Frontier of Afghanistan to be

* Both these cantonments ultimately disappeared; but there were some other features in Lord Kitchener's scheme, and especially the abolition of the Punjab Frontier Force, with which it was not possible to agree.

a pledge which might involve us in incalculable difficulties. . . . My view is, as it has always been, that we ought to avoid carefully entering into closer relations with the Amir, but should endeavour to arrange a formal undertaking with Russia." This view, which I had long held,* prevailed later.

Among Liberal Ministers, I saw most of Mr. Morley, and my diary records many long talks with him, ranging over all Indian questions. Unfitted in certain respects for the great post which he held, he had a most attractive personality. A delightful conversationalist, with a cynical but not unkindly humour, he would always listen, while rarely giving his own views in reply. Here was a political philosopher and eminent man of letters, an autocrat by nature but a democrat—though with misgivings—by profession, who believed in Parliament so long as he could mould it to his will. The conditions of India with her long and warlike history and immemorial traditions he could never realise, and he acquired a lively contempt of the Indian bureaucracy, which arose from lack of vision and was not justified. I can never forget his unvarying kindness and tolerance of our occasional disagreements; but later a cloud was to arise between us never wholly dissipated.

Many questions connected with the frontier required decisions in 1907, and my diary records: "Long talk with Morley at Club. He seems still undecided about frontier questions, but said he had not the slightest belief in any Russian idea of invading India" (February 27). An important Sub-Committee, over which he presided, had been appointed and was then taking evidence in order to elucidate frontier railway policy. The result was a report which I could not sign as he particularly wished; but he never resented my obstinacy, and wrote: "I understand your feelings of aversion to moving from old landmarks" (May 9, 1907).

In 1907, the dangerous activities of "India House," instituted by the notorious Krishnavarma and the violent

* See p. 112.

language of the *Indian Sociologist*,* which was advocating assassination, came to my notice, and I laid the whole matter before Mr. Morley, begging him to take action for the protection of young Indian students in London. I had ascertained the measures adopted by the Japanese to guard their young Nationals in this country, and I pleaded that we should follow their example. In all such matters we are usually careless. Mr. Morley wrote on May 23 that my appeal "touches a real and powerful root of evil and one, like most roots of evil for that matter, most difficult to get at. We are turning over various devices in our minds; but the Atlantic is not easy to beat off your doorsteps." The difficulty in protecting young Indian students from corruption certainly existed; but nothing was done. The *Indian Sociologist* went on urging murder and armed rebellion.† On July 1, 1909, Sir W. Curzon Wyllie ‡ and Dr. Lalcaca were assassinated at the Imperial Institute, as planned at one of the Sunday meetings at "India House"; but Krishnavarma escaped to Paris, and the *Indian Sociologist* continued to appear till July, 1914. Not till August 25, 1909, was a warrant issued against a printer, Guy Aldred of the "Bakunin Press," in connection with this vile publication.

Lord Morley was deeply shocked by the murders, and on July 9, 1909, he wrote to me in India: "It is now thought pretty clear by the police and other authorities, that we have to make our account with a gang—small but all the more dangerous for that—bent on desperate violence. It does not in the least surprise me, and I have publicly said so much more than once." Yet India House could have been broken up at any time, and the *Indian Sociologist* had persistently violated the criminal law.

Sir E. Grey was always ready to make use of the Defence Committee as the following letter indicates: "Have you time to come and see me at the F.O. to-

* Started in 1905.

† "We repeat that political assassination is not murder" (July, 1909).

‡ Another victim was intended.

morrow [Friday]? . . . if not to-morrow, then some day next week. I should like the Baghdad Railway and the question of the Garrison of Egypt to come before the Defence Committee" (June 7, 1906).

The Baghdad Railway formed the subject of three Memoranda in which I embodied the studies of the Secretariat and suggested a definite policy now rendered valueless by events. I did not then understand the implications of the great Pan-German movement which began to take form about 1897, and was an important contributory cause of the Great War,* but my general conclusion in January, 1905, was that "we have the strongest grounds for preventing a Railway from Baghdad to the Gulf from falling wholly under the control of a power which regards its own interest exclusively and which well understands the manipulation of railway rates."

The preliminaries of The Hague Conference of 1906 occupied much of our attention, and I was a Member of a Committee which sat for some time at the Foreign Office to deal with the many questions which thus arose. Being nervous lest the right of capture of the private property of belligerents at sea might be abandoned, I wrote a long memorandum on the subject in May, 1906, selecting the case of a war with Germany for the reason that "Germany has the largest foreign trade and the greatest tonnage of shipping of all the Continental Powers, and both are growing more rapidly than in the case of other nations. Germany has also a steadily growing Navy, which tends to become next in strength to our own." My general conclusion could only be "that we have nothing to gain and much to lose by abandoning the right in question." This memorandum upset the equanimity of the Lord Chancellor (Lord Loreburn), who was a good friend in later years, and I find in my diary: "Attorney-General says Asquith opposed to us as regards capture of

* From Lord Grey's most interesting book I gather that the Foreign Office at a later date did not realise the ominous aspects of the grandiose and far-reaching Pan-German schemes, which involved the control of Serbia.

anything much more tiresome. The pressure for Lord K. ever since November has been very severe, and from several important quarters, where resistance has been by no means easy. Of course, on the other hand, it would have been still less easy for the supporters of a military appointment to carry it without the approval of the S.S., and in the present case the S.S. would have marked the sincerity of his approval by abdication. When this was realised, the difficulties melted away. . . . Now a word personal to yourself. *You* were vigorously commended to me, as the name that would give most pleasure to the whole host of our best friends in India. This was no surprise to me at all, and it gave me lively pleasure as a mark of the recognition accorded to your qualities and performances. There would have been a loud shout of approval, and it would, I do believe, have been pretty general, tho' not universal. But you are far too familiar with the world of Whitehall and Westminster, not to know the multitude of considerations that a Minister making an appointment of this sort has to take into account, some of them wearing an irrelevant look enough, yet weighty and inevitable. Whether the idea ever entered your own mind, I do not know. It would be no more than natural that it should, that is quite certain. I only want you to know from myself that it entered my mind and long dwelt there as a possibility."

Nothing could have been kinder or more considerate, and I was, therefore, astonished to find a different story in Sir Almeric Fitzroy's *Memoirs*.*

I cannot now remember whether, in my letter by the next mail, I commented upon Lord Morley's decision; but I find it difficult to believe that he could have said,

* "Sir George Clarke's peerage led Lord Morley to some observations on his career at Bombay, for which he was responsible. It appears that it was marred by displays of vainglory which had reached such a pitch when Minto came home that he had persuaded himself his claims to the succession could not be overlooked. On Lord Morley writing to him, in the most considerate terms, to explain that it was impracticable, he never took the trouble to answer his letter. 'I then let him drop,' he continued, 'but apparently somebody else has taken him up.' "

"I then let him drop," because I have many subsequent letters which absolutely refute this allegation.

On July 1, at the end of a letter in which he seemed to complain of the extradition proceedings taken against Vinayek Savarkar,* and especially of the action of the Bengal Government in the case of Arabindo Ghose, Lord Morley suddenly announced a change gravely affecting my position. "I further intend to direct the G. of I. to revert to the older practice of requiring the local Governments to refer to the G. of I. before starting political prosecutions. You will not like this possibly; but it is the only means of making sure of a coherent and co-ordinated policy."

This decision came like a bolt from the blue at a time when I was immersed in heavy work and oppressed by many anxieties, and I recalled my painful experience in the Sudan twenty-five years earlier,† when my career seemed to have come to an end. I had accepted the Governorship of Bombay with the responsibility of maintaining order, but with powers which my predecessors had wielded for many years, and I hoped that I had won Lord Morley's confidence. These powers were now to be suddenly withdrawn, and the significance would be understood in every bazaar in the Presidency. The advantages expected would not be gained. A local Governor could give personal attention to every proposed prosecution, which would be quite impossible to the Governor-General, who would also be ignorant of the local conditions which might require immediate action in one province that could be avoided or postponed in another.

I saw before me a long vista of voluminous correspondence ending in adverse decisions prompted by

* The legality of these proceedings was argued at length in England. V. D. Savarkar, a Konkanasth Brahman, was one of the most dangerous men that India has produced. He was the leading spirit at India House when the murders at the Imperial Institute were planned, and one of his satellites accompanied the wretched assassin Dhingra to keep him to his fatal resolve. Savarkar sent twenty Browning pistols purchased in Paris to Bombay, and one of them was used for the murder of Mr. Jackson at Nasik. All this and more Lord Morley seemed not to know.

† See p. 63.

subordinates in the Secretariat of the Government of India. Moreover, "coherent" sentences could no more be obtained than in the Courts of this country, and it was even doubtful whether Lord Morley's ukase could be legally enforced without revising the penal code, which conferred powers upon the local governments.

I protested at once by telegraph and letter, no doubt too vehemently, and I frankly said that I might be forced to reconsider my position. This may have been unwise; but I felt strongly, and India is a hot country.

On August 24, Lord Morley wrote:

"I am a good deal afflicted by your letter of August 3. 'The crux of the matter,' you say, 'is the answer to the question, "Have I succeeded here, or have I failed to deserve your confidence?" If I have succeeded, may I not be trusted a little longer? If I have failed, is it not better for me to go?' I cannot but believe that, on reflection, you will see that this is wholly unfair to me. . . . I don't believe any S.S. ever did more to express my recognition of success—warm, cordial, and persistent recognition of your Indian services."

This was most true; but the two knights were looking at different sides of the shield, and Lord Morley could not see that he was proposing radically to change my position in the eyes of all the diverse peoples of the Presidency, which I again tried to explain. On September 27, he wrote: "You dwell on the 'Indian way of looking at things,' and talk of the Indian view being the only thing that matters. I by no means agree with you in the latter proposition, which really signifies that the only thing that matters is what a particular local Government believes to be the Indian way of looking at things." If only I could have made Lord Morley understand what *izzat* means to *all* Indians, and how they would inevitably regard the sudden withdrawal of one of the most important powers entrusted to a Governor, all might have been well; but this was not possible. The memory of this sharp disagreement with my Chief, which was most trying at the time, has been softened by the years; but there is a moral. It can rarely be wise to take away necessary powers from a responsible official, especially when full knowledge of local conditions is denied to the reigning autocrat. My experience has no doubt fallen to others who were perhaps less insistent upon what they believed to be their rights. Unless the man on the spot has plainly shown want of judgment, it must generally be best to trust him, remembering that no correspondence can ever convey the realities of a complex situation to a Minister who has no personal knowledge to guide his decisions.

I finally decided to resign, undertaking to remain at my post until a successor could be provided, when a sudden and obscure turn in the political kaleidoscope transformed Lord Morley into the Lord President of the Council before any orders were issued. In his farewell letter on October 19, he wrote:

"I look back upon most of the time of our correspondence with infinite satisfaction. In the more recent part of it, I do not find myself so happy, for I seemed to observe a certain departure * from the principles on which we began our policy. If I had remained, this possible discrepancy might have become serious. As it is, it is not for me now to say more."

I am afraid that I was never quite forgiven, and I may have been at fault for not making allowances for Lord Morley's training and temperament, which rendered it peculiarly difficult for him to enter into the feelings of a lonely Governor in a distant land of which he knew nothing. To me it was a lesson in administration which I took to heart.

The news of King Edward's death arrived on May 7, and I felt a deep sense of personal loss. All through the years 1904–7, His Majesty had been in close touch with the reorganisation of Imperial Defence then in progress, which owed much to his support and encouragement.

* It seemed to me that the only "departure" was on Lord Morley's side.