

## Article 4

### The Unveiling of the Freedom Movement of India, Part I

**“In every age it has been the tyrant, the oppressor and the exploiter who has wrapped himself in the cloak of patriotism, or religion, or both to deceive and overawe the People.”**

- Eugene Victor Debs

In this article and the next, I shall present the most sensitive, and probably the most unacceptable-to-all and difficult-to-believe, facts of the Freedom Movement of India.

I shall outline how the Congress, Gandhi, and Jawaharlal Nehru planted the seed of Pakistan, nurtured the Pakistan plant tenderly, and then plucked the fruit. They did this in two ways:

- actively, by promoting the Pakistan scheme; and
- passively, by taking several wrong political decisions in their quest for total power in free India.

Jinnah and the Muslim League definitely made a demand for Pakistan. But it was the Congress that gave the Pakistan demand body and shape in the politics of India—while screaming for Hindu-Muslim unity. The Congress High Command was so busy scheming to get total control and power in free India, they didn't care what cost India and Indians would have to pay. Having come to power they have orchestrated one of the most successful cover-ups in world history.

#### **Tilling the soil for the Pakistan Plant:**

Before going into a detailed account from 1937 onwards, I shall give two major landmarks on the Pathway to Partition till then:

- Khilafat Movement, 1921

Gandhi attached the Indian Freedom movement to the Khilafat Movement. **This lead directly to religion entering the politics of India.**

Indians were now Indians no more, but Hindus and Muslims.

- The Communal Award in 1931

Instead of sending the 16 delegates to the Round Table Conference, Gandhi went as the sole representative of Congress. Congress made no effort to oppose the Communal Award.

**Religion now entered the *Constitution of India* . . . !**

Hindus could only vote for Hindus, Muslims for Muslims and so on.

To gain a clear cut majority in the elections, Congress needed to woo the Muslims to gain their votes. Muslim appeasement reached new heights from here onwards.

It is also essential to understand the Jinnah-Nehru-Gandhi background.

- The tragedy of India was the undercurrents and clashes between Jinnah and Gandhi-Nehru; none of them looked beyond their own petty egos and aspirations to power and consider what was right for the motherland.

In her book *Indian Summer* (page 80-81), Alex Von Tunzelmann has captured the essence of the situation.

“Jinnah had begun his political career in Congress. He made himself a figurehead for Hindu-Muslim unity and was acclaimed as such by Hindu Congress luminaries. He joined the Muslim League in 1913, confident that he could act as a bridge between the political parties. But it was the emergence of Gandhi as the spiritual leader of Congress in 1920 that began to push Jinnah out. “I will have nothing to do with this pseudo-religious approach to politics,” Jinnah had said, rejecting the call for satyagraha. . . .

There was a profound and deadly clash of personality between Jinnah and the other English gentleman of Congress, Jawaharlal Nehru. . . .”

In case anyone has any objections to Nehru being referred to as the “other English gentleman,” check out this little snippet from an interview of John Kenneth Galbraith by Arun Venugopal:

“While the pace of his day has slowed down, John Kenneth Galbraith's mind remains vibrant and unrelenting. He also talks of his close friendship with Nehru, who figures in his book *Name-Dropping*. "You realise, Galbraith," Nehru had once told him, "I am the last Englishman to rule in India."

Read the whole interview @ <http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?212952>

**What a tragedy for India—to be freed from the British Raj only to be “ruled” by an Englishman passing himself off as an Indian . . . ?**

To continue with Alex Von Tunzelmann’s account:

“After the Conference [Round Table Conference, 1931], he [Jinnah] returned to private life—until a friend reported to him a comment made by his archrival, Jawaharlal Nehru. In conversation at a private dinner party, Jawahar had remarked that Jinnah was ‘finished.’ Jinnah was so furious that he packed up and headed back to India immediately, with the stated intent to ‘show Nehru.’”

And “show Nehru” he did indeed!

From that moment on, Jinnah pitted his considerable political skills against the Gandhi-Nehru-led Congress, whose fumbling and bumbling in their thirst for total power was no match for “one of the most brilliant politicians of his day.”

Jinnah had been truly secular and nationalist in his early political days. But besides the Congress there was no other national party of substance at the time. Once Jinnah left the Congress, he had no nationalist party to join. Being Muslim, there was no way Jinnah was going to be able to charm the Hindu majority—so bedazzled by the Mahatma that it was—away from the dangerous and self-serving politics of the Congress by himself.

To counteract the Congress, Gandhi, and Nehru—and that had become the ruling passion of his life—his only option was to build a strong Muslim party. And in doing so he sacrificed his secular and nationalist principles.

- He sacrificed India.

### **The Political Situation in 1937:**

So in 1937, we have Jinnah of the political acumen *par excellence* full of animus against Gandhi and Nehru and extremely suspicious of their intentions. On the other hand, we have Gandhi and Nehru (who also bore ill-will to Jinnah)<sup>1</sup> who were riding high with the Congress being the only national party of substance and the tremendous support of the Hindu majority. Congress was bound to be the ruling party in free India.

If only they had been satisfied with that much. But no, Gandhi and Nehru’s lust for power knew no bounds. Within the Congress itself they brooked no opposition and ruled with total control and power, and they sought to throw that mantle over the whole of India.

There was also the problem of the Hindu-Muslim power struggle created by the communal Constitution of India—the responsibility for which can be unambiguously laid at the Congress door. As Penderel Moon, I.C.S., puts it in his *Strangers in India*, ( page 101):

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<sup>1</sup> Jinnah’s wife had been (she died in 1929, and was separated from Jinnah at the time) close friends with both Nehru’s sister, Nan, and Padmaja Naidu who later became Nehru’s lover (from Alex Tunzelmann’s *Indian Summer*, page 81.) Who can say what kind of personal differences these two may have had arising from this situation?

“In essence the struggle [Hindu-Muslim communal struggle] is one for posts and political power between two communities distinguished by religion and culture.”

And how was this power distributed in India in 1937?

- Congress was the only national Indian party of substance
- Jinnah and the Muslim League with no clout as yet
- Savarkar, only just released from bondage in 1937, not quite yet on the political field.

This was the moment for the Congress to embrace the Federation plan of the British, and tie the whole of India—Hindus, Muslims, Princely States et al—into one unified force. The Viceroy Linlithgow was pushing heavily for it.

- Did the Congress do that?  
No.

This is the background of Indian politics in 1937. We shall see now how the Congress actually went about bludgeoning India’s chances of a united freedom.

### **Gathering the Seeds of the Pakistan Plant:**

In 1937, the Congress came right out and revealed its goal of total control in the governing of India. They had the Hindus in their pocket, and were under the impression that the Muslims would also happily crawl in there. Well, they certainly had a rude awakening!

In his book, *History of the Freedom Movement in India, Vol. III* (hence forth to be referred to as HFMI, Vol. III) page 551-52, R. C. Majumdar, a noted historian, writes:

“The result of the elections held in 1937 belied the claims of both the Congress and the Muslim League. . . . It was a clear indication that the Congress organization had no contact with the Muslim masses and had very little influence over them. The Congress could not therefore advance any reasonable claim to represent the Muslims. . . . It is not a little curious that the Muslim League had a specially bad record of election success in those Provinces like Bengal, the Punjab, Sindh and North-West Frontier Province where the Muslims formed the majority community, and fared much better in the Provinces which had a strong Hindu majority with a significant and vocal minority.”

**[Point to note:**

**The Muslims of the very provinces which went to Pakistan in 1947 had happily voted for nationalist Muslim parties in 1937. . . ! A Central Federation at this time would have bound them to a united India.]**

“The reason is that the Muslim League had no special positive programme which distinguished it from the other parties and had no local influence in any Province. It thrived only on its assumed character as a bulwark of defense against Hindu attack. The Provinces with a Muslim majority had no genuine fear of such an attack, and were not therefore susceptible to the propaganda of the League.

It is only when the Muslim masses learnt to look upon the problem from an all-India perspective that the Muslim League emerged as the most powerful Muslim organization. . . . The credit of Jinnah lies in the fact that he succeeded in developing this political consciousness among the Muslims within an incredibly short time. . . .”

And to do that, he too brought religion into politics!

“He touched the chord of religious feelings of the Muslims which have always proved a potent factor in Muslim politics. ‘The *Mullahs* of the countryside were soon up in arms against the Congress propagandist . . . .’ The Congress mass contact movement, which had made some headway, collapsed under the attack of the *Mullahs*.”<sup>2</sup>

“The intransigence of the Congress high command helped its growth. They took their stand on the theory that the Congress represented the whole of India . . . They ignored the Muslim League as having no influence over the masses and only representing a ‘microscopic minority’ of the Muslims . . . But they discounted the idea that there may be a national urge among the Muslims limited to their own community . . . and though a nationalist may disapprove such a development, a Statesman can ignore it at his peril.

Jawaharlal Nehru in particular, among the Congress leaders must be held highly guilty in this respect. . . . It [Congress] did not learn the obvious lesson of coming to terms with the Muslim League till by its [Congress’s] folly the League had attained a position when it could dictate its own terms, and demanded Pakistan as the only basis of settlement.”<sup>3</sup>

This is how R. C. Majumdar wraps it up in a nutshell: “In 1937 his [Nehru’s] outright rejection of Jinnah’s offer of Congress-League Coalition Ministry ruined the last chance of a Hindu-Muslim agreement.”

So much for the much-touted Congress Hindu-Muslim unity demand of the Congress. . . ! Making a demand is one thing, but it is the actions that follow that tell the tale.

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<sup>2</sup> *HFMI, Vol. III*, R. C. Majumdar, page 568.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*; page 551-552

## **Planting the Seeds of Pakistan**

The period 1937 to 1938 was crucial in Indian Freedom Movement history. It is at this time that the Congress ambitions—of acquiring total control in governing India—became crystal clear, not to the poor, gullible Indians, but to Viceroy Linlithgow, Jinnah, and Savarkar.

From here on:

- Congress chances of total control were on a downward spiral, which increased their desperation and led to them sacrificing the motherland more and more.
- Jinnah set himself against the Congress and its ambition by wielding Islam as a very formidable weapon.
- Savarkar swooped upon the political field to rouse the Hindus into saving their motherland.

A vicious circle was formed: the more Congress aimed for control—greedily, the more Jinnah wielded the Islam weapon—successfully, and the more Savarkar roused the Hindus—desperately. This led back to the Congress indulging in more scheming.

### **What exactly did Congress, particularly Nehru, do to trigger this vicious circle?**

R. C. Majumdar writes in *History of the Freedom Movement of India, Vol. III*:

“It was taken for granted both in the Report of the Simon Commission and the discussions in the Round Table Conference that the main communities, particularly the Muslims, ought to be, and in fact would be, represented in the Provincial Ministries. . . .”

Having made their bed of thorns by accepting, without a protest, the Communal Award, it was now incumbent upon the Congress to accept its dictates. But the Congress High Command ruling the Congress like a dictatorship, sought to govern the Provinces in the same manner.

“But when the Congress decided to accept office there arose a strong difference between the two [Congress and League] . . . the Congress, in pursuance of their principle mentioned above [that in Congress Provinces the Ministers should be selected solely from the Congress Party,] offered to include the members of the Muslim League only on certain conditions which practically meant dissolution of the Muslim League and the incorporation of its members in the Congress organization . . .

These detailed terms only translated into practice the pithy saying attributed to Nehru that ‘there were only two parties in the country—the Congress and the British Government.’”

It was preposterously arrogant and short-sighted of the Congress to imagine that Jinnah and the Muslim League would meekly become Congress puppets . . . !

“No wise statesman could seriously believe that the Muslim League would readily give up its own separate identity and merge itself in the Congress. The Muslim League refused to commit political *Harakiri* at the bidding of the Congress.”<sup>4</sup>

In addition to this, the Congress mass contact movement for the Muslims had a shocking approach—though one in keeping with their arrogant dictatorship.

“In effect, though not in actual words, it [Congress mass contact movement for the Muslims] amounted to an insidious propaganda of the following type: ‘Political power with all the patronage and influence it implied was exclusively in Congress hands, and there it would remain.’”

True to its principles, the Congress would not deny a fair share of its appointments from Minister’s office downwards to the Moslem minority, but it could not be expected to bestow them on any but the Congress Moslems. For a Moslem to stay in the League, therefore, was to condemn himself to a lifetime of wilderness. Let him make the other choice, and make it at once while the door was still open.”<sup>5</sup>

The Congress had prodded the beast in Jinnah by both, arrogantly demanding dissolution of the Muslim League and by dangling the carrot of political power—only available by joining the Congress, they implied—before the Muslims.

And Jinnah, the master politician, out-maneuvered the Congress High Command practically overnight. He laid down conditions for negotiations that cut at the very foundation upon which the Congress was based for the last so many years.

By 1938, the Congress pride came before a great fall, indeed, at the hands of Jinnah.

“Jinnah took up the position that the condition precedent to all negotiations was a frank recognition of the Congress and the League as the only representative bodies, respectively, of the Hindus and Muslims of India.

The executive Committee of the All-India Muslim League passed a resolution to the effect that ‘it is not possible for the All-India Muslim League to treat and negotiate with the Congress the question of Hindu-Muslim settlement except on the basis that the Muslim League is the authoritative and representative organization of the Musalmans of India.’

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<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, 561

<sup>5</sup> *ibid*, page 566.

But this was not all. Jinnah made it clear in his letter to Subhas Bose, dated 2 August, 1938, that the committee appointed by the Congress to discuss the Hindu-Muslim questions should not include any Musalman. . . . It is easy to see that the Congress could not accept these demands without stultifying its whole history as a national organization of Indians of all faith and communities.

The Congress demand in 1937 that the Muslims must liquidate the Muslim League if they wanted to share powers with the Congress was bad enough, but it was far worse to demand that the Indian National Congress, with its proud records of more than half a century's service as a national organization, should voluntarily degrade itself into a communal Organization only to serve as a counterpart to the Muslim League."<sup>6</sup>

Oh, how neatly Jinnah had turned the tables on the Congress!

### **Planting the Seeds of the Pakistan Plant:**

Jinnah's master-stroke had reduced the Congress to a Hindu party in effect. How Gandhi and Nehru must have wished he would just go poof!

- But since the "bogey" Jinnah could not be made to go poof, in the years that followed they sought to be rid of him through partition.

Nehru's words in his diary illuminate this quite clearly. On December 28, 1943, he writes:

"Instinctively I think it is better to have Pakistan or almost nothing if only to keep Jinnah far away and not allow his muddled and arrogant head from (sic) interfering continually in India's progress."

Let us see the how the first seed of Pakistan was planted.

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<sup>6</sup> *ibid*, 569

"Now, if at this moment the Muslims were fully assured that this sort of composite government would be formed at the centre, and that the Muslims in it would be real representatives of the Muslim community and not merely nominees of the Hindus, they would probably be satisfied. But owing to the recent conduct of the Congress they feel no such assurance. They believe that Congress's aim is to establish Hindu Raj at the center . . . Congress policy has certainly created this impression. For after sweeping victories in the provincial elections, Congress proceeded to form pure Congress ministries in every Province. In none of them would they admit the principle of coalition. . . . It is pure Congress Raj . . ." *Strangers in India*, by Penderel Moon, I.C.S., page 106.

"When the Congress decided to accept office there was a proposal that it should form coalition ministries with the Muslim League. . . . The Congress decided to have homogeneous ministries of its own and chose Muslim ministers from amongst those who were members of the Congress Party. This was the beginning of a serious rift between the Congress and the League and was a factor which induced neutral Muslim opinion to turn to the support of Jinnah. . . . Jinnah and the other leaders of the Muslim League, embittered by the controversy on the issue of coalition ministries, now began to play with the idea of a separate State, and turned against the conception of an all-India federation." *Transfer of Power*, V. P. Menon, pages 56-57.



The Government of India Act of 1935 required that a Central Federation be formed. Viceroy Linlithgow was avidly seeking to form this Federation. But the Congress had set itself against the Federation and did its very best to hamper the Viceroy's attempts to form this Federation in every possible way.

Surely, forming a Central Federation—one that united all the Provinces and the Princely States—was extremely desirable? Would it not have nipped any thought of partition in the bud? Instead the Congress chose to oppose it. And not just oppose, Birla, one of Gandhi's mouthpieces to the Viceroy, put an unbelievable proposal before the Viceroy!

“Birla said that the communal position in India was getting rapidly worse. Congress was aware of it and its leaders were deeply anxious. He then suggested that the best course might be to let the Muslims have their Federation of the North-West. This astonished Linlithgow, who thought at first that Birla was teasing him. When he saw that the suggestion was serious he asked Birla whether he envisaged the perpetuation of British military power to keep peace between Muslim and Hindu Federation . . .

This was a most interesting conversation. It showed clearly Linlithgow's dread of partition and therefore his shock at encouragement for it coming from a Hindu.”<sup>7</sup>

This conversation has taken place in *1938*. Let the truth not escape anyone:

- “Muslim Federation of the North-West”: what is that but another name for Pakistan?
- A demand for a separate Hindu and Muslim Federation in private and the public face . . . ? A vociferous demand for Hindu-Muslim unity.

Yes indeed, the seed of Pakistan had now been planted on the soil that was tilled in 1937.

### **Whither Congress . . . ?**

In 1939, with the WWII well under way, Viceroy Linlithgow was trying to keep all parties of India happy. He met fifty-two leaders of the various parties of India as a “thorough way of hearing a cross-section of opinion at a vital moment.” He was also thinking along the lines of having an all-party meeting in an attempt to ease the situation toward making the Central Federation work and getting cooperation for his war efforts.

He first met the Congress leaders, one by one. With the Congress controlling eight out of the eleven provinces and being such a powerful party of India, their cooperation was essential.

What did the Congress High Command do?

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<sup>7</sup> Viceroy Lord Linlithgow's biography, *The Viceroy at Bay*, by John Glendevon, page 88.

- They angled for total control at the center and threatened resigning from the ministries and boycotting of the all-party meeting as a way of twisting the Viceroy's arm.

Here is how the meeting between Gandhi and the Viceroy proceeded.

“Gandhi then asked the Viceroy for a declaration by Government of what he called ‘**a really satisfying kind: Congress was in a special position and could alone achieve results.**’ He wanted a declaration of British intentions and an arrangement by which Congress could share power at the Centre with the Government”<sup>8</sup>

The Viceroy was not going to entertain the Congress demand for total control at the center. He needed the Muslim cooperation much too much for that. The army—so critical for running the Empire and Britain's war efforts—was made up mostly of Muslims. But the Congress never grasped that, they still set themselves against the Central Federation since their demands were not being met.

“The Viceroy pointed out that the essential preliminary to such a government was that measure of agreement between parties, communities and interests which he had been so anxious to foster, but to which the excessive claims and the totalitarian ambitions of the Congress and its leaders had been so consistently an obstacle.”<sup>9</sup>

“I [Linlithgow] was bound to remind him [Gandhi] that to most thinking men they appeared to make the attainment of Dominion Status, or of complete self-government difficult to a degree, if not wholly impossible at this stage.’ . . . The Viceroy said that he had been thinking of all possible ways of easing the situation. He had thought of an All-parties meeting.”<sup>10</sup>

But the Congress High Command were unanimous in their stand against an All-Party meeting. For them it was Congress and only Congress who should be considered in the politics of India.

“Gandhi thought that an All-Parties conference should be avoided at all costs. . . .

As for an All-Parties Conference, he [Rajendra Prasad] was resolutely against the idea. . . .

Nehru, too, was against an All-Parties Conference, which both he and Prasad thought the Congress would boycott.”<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> *The Viceroy at Bay*, John Glendevon, page 142.

<sup>9</sup> *Transfer of Power*, V. P. Menon, page 148.

<sup>10</sup> *The Viceroy at Bay*, John Glendevon, page 143.

<sup>11</sup> *The Viceroy at Bay*, John Glendevon, page 144-147.

Here was the stand Jinnah took:

“Jinnah did not like the idea of a declaration as it would only increase communal tension. He saw no chance of unity unless Congress gave up the claim to speak on behalf of all parties and recognized the Muslim League as spokesman for the Muslims.”<sup>12</sup>

Status quo was maintained. Congress wanting to be the only party in Indian politics, Jinnah most determined that that will not happen. He wanted the Muslim League to be the only party to represent the Muslims.

So what happened next?

### **The Turning Point . . .**

By 1939, Viceroy Linlithgow was in an unenviable position. With the WWII going on in full strength he had to keep both the Congress and the League happy. Not an easy task when the two were at loggerheads with each other.

- Support of the League was essential because the Muslims made up the bulk of the army and the army in war times was critical.
- Support of the Congress was essential because they ran eight of the eleven provinces and could seriously hamper the administration of India.

Viceroy Linlithgow was really walking a tightrope politically. His attitude toward Jinnah changed significantly. Jinnah himself had astutely perceived this.

“Jinnah remarked later [after September 4, 1939, meeting], ‘After the war . . . suddenly there came a change in the attitude towards me. I was treated on the same basis as Mr. Gandhi. I was wonderstruck why all of a sudden I was promoted and given a place side by side with Mr. Gandhi.’”<sup>13</sup>

“In the Viceroy’s view, it remained as important as ever to give the fullest weight to the Muslim position at a time when their assistance and support were so essential to His Majesty’s Government, both from the military point of view (they were providing 60 percent of the army) and because of possible reactions in other countries.”<sup>14</sup>

But the Congress was in a strong position with the Viceroy as well. The Viceroy was certainly not going to upset them.

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<sup>12</sup> *The Viceroy at Bay*, John Glendevon, page 150.

<sup>13</sup> *Transfer of Power*, V. P. Menon, page 59.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid*, page 87.

- This was the time to use bargaining power wisely.
- Unfortunately, the Congress High Command simply had no political acumen! And so proceeded to lose the only political advantage they had.

The Congress was demanding that “India must be declared an independent nation and present application must be given to this status to the largest possible extent.” There wasn’t any way the British were going to focus on leaving India (even had they wanted to) when they were desperately trying to save their own skin and freedom from Hitler . . . !<sup>15</sup>

“The Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, issued a statement on 17 October, 1939. He reiterated that Dominion Status was the goal of British policy, but pointed out that for the present the Act of 1935 held the field. . . . The Congress Working Committee regarded the Viceroy’s statement as ‘an unequivocal reiteration of the imperialist policy’ and therefore declared itself unable to give any support to Great Britain, for it would amount to an endorsement of the imperialistic policy, which it has always sought to end. *As a first step in this direction* the Committee called upon the Congress Ministers to resign. All the Congress Ministries accordingly resigned between 27 October and 15 November, 1939.

Both the Secretary of State, Sir Samuel Hoare, and the Viceroy tried to win over the Congress leaders by granting more powers to Indians in the administration. But the Congress ‘declined to consider any steps to further co-operation’ unless the British Government clearly declared its policy in favour of Indian independence, and demanded the appointment of a Constituent Assembly. . . .”

Here was a great opportunity lost by the Congress short-sightedness! Surely, this was the time to hang in there, especially with more powers being given? Is there ever anything to gain by resigning and taking oneself off the scene? The Congress strategy to resign from ministries and disrupt the functioning of the Provinces was an utter failure.

To continue:

“The Viceroy felt relieved by the resignation of Congress Ministeries, for they controlled eight out of the eleven Provinces and so had power to impair war-efforts of the Government. As the eight Provinces were now being ruled by the Governors, there was no longer any need to placate the Congress, and the Viceroy canvassed the support of the Muslim League.

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<sup>15</sup> “If the Congress leaders had only discussed the details of the reconstitution of the Executive council, it is possible that the Viceroy would have gone more than half to way meet the Congress. In the wartime there was no question of converting the Executive Council into a national government. Lord Linlithgow was firm on this issue and so was His Majesty’s Government. Had the Congress joined the Viceroy’s Executive Council at this time, and with Congress ministries coming back into power in the provinces, the political situation would have changed immensely to the advantage of the Congress. Once the Congress rejected the offer the Viceroy was in no mood to carry on any further parleys with it.” *Transfer of Power*, V. P. Menon, page 97.

This considerably strengthened the position of the League and it was joined by the waverers among the Muslims. In March, 1940, the Muslim League, at its Lahore Session, made a formal demand for a separate Muslim State.”<sup>16</sup>

**With increased influence with the Viceroy of the Muslim League, the Pakistan demand was now formally made—a direct cause-and-effect of the Congress misguided decision to resign from their provincial ministries.**

“The decision of the Congress to resign was widely regretted. Even within the Congress there were some who were opposed to this course. We shall see, as we proceed, how it only weakened the bargaining power of the Congress. . . .

When, however, the Congress resigned office, Lord Linlithgow’s attitude automatically changed. There was no longer any necessity to woo the Congress . . . From now on, Lord Linlithgow began to lean more on the support of the Muslim League and to discountenance any move on the part of the Congress to return to office except on his own terms. . . . For all practical purposes Jinnah was given a veto on further constitutional progress and, Jinnah adroit politician that he was, he made the very most of the situation.”<sup>17</sup>

There! Not only had the Congress put themselves outside the political pale, their asininity in doing so led directly to a strong Muslim League making a formal Pakistan demand. Jinnah was not one to let grass grow beneath his feet!

Now, the Congress—to counteract their own political blunders and to rid themselves of Jinnah and the League—began to push the Pakistan scheme themselves. That will be covered in the next article.

Anurupa Cinar

Author, *Burning for Freedom*

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<sup>16</sup> HFMI, Vol. III, R. C. Majumdar, pages 598-600.

<sup>17</sup> *Transfer of Power*, V. P. Menon. Page 68